![]() This process was complicated, but by 1918 all sides on the Western Front could break through enemy positions thanks to a CAW built around the infantry on foot. During the First World War, the armies on the Western Front developed a basic concept for CAW for four years, as Jonathan Bailey points out. ![]() Throughout the 20th century, armies constantly had to adapt to the harsh realities of the battlefield, a highly competitive environment in which attack and defence continuously tried to outdo each other with new weapons and tactics. Although it’s a part of warfare since warfare exists, most military historians see the First World War as a turning point and a major change that laid the foundations for contemporary CAW, as Jonathan Bailey confirms with his definition of what he calls modern warfare: “ the advent of three-dimensional conflict through artillery indirect fire as the foundation of planning at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war”. CAW is often a joint event-joint being an “ Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate.” because it involves, more often than not, elements of air and/or navy forces who then generate effects to support the land forces. Electronic Warfare and synchronisation with the Combat Service Support-manning, arming, fixing, fueling, moving, and sustaining-are integral to it. ![]() CAW has proved crucial in many wars and conflicts, both in classic operations-such as in Ukraine-and special operations, counter-insurgency, asymmetric warfare or low-intensity conflicts. ![]() Instead of seeing this as the final bankruptcy of tanks, this text argues that a partial solution to the Russian tactical problems can be found in the proper implementation of CAW, being “ the synchronised and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially”. In the first weeks of the war, social media were awash with spectacular footage of exploding Russian tanks and armoured vehicles, often after being hit by anti-tank missiles such as the Javelin or NLAW. The poor performance of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine shows once again that high-intensity land operations are incredibly complex undertakings. ![]()
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